Let ZFI,(ZFI,-)
be intuitionistic ZF set theory formulated with Replacement (resp. Collection).
It is known that if ZFI, proves a sentence 3.r.4(1), then there is a formula C(z) so that ZFI, proves 3!zC(z) and 3.u(C(x) A A(x)), the existence property.
It is shown that ZFIc does not have the existence property, and thus ZFI, s ZFI,. This remains true even if one adds Dependent Choice and all true 2', sentence of ZF. It is known that ZF and ZFI,-have the same provably recursive functions.
It is also shown that this is not true for ZFI,. and ZFI,. It is known that most considered theories T in Heyting's predicate calculus with equality have the existence property: if T proves a sentence 3xA(x), then there is a formula C(z) with exactly z free, so that T proves 3!&(z) and 3x(C(x) A A(x)). In classical logic, Zermelo set theory, ZF, and ZFC are known not to have the existence property. In particular, Feferman [3] and Levy [14] gave forcing extensions which show the failure of the existence property for Z7: sets. Nevertheless, one has the fragment of the existence property as a consequence of the uniformization property for 2: sets. This is important in point-set topology and descriptive set theory [ 151, where given a definable relation, one wants a definable 2 FRIEDMAN AND i %EDROV function with the same domain. ZF+ Projective Determinacy has the projective existence property (with A(x), C(z) projective). Kunen observes that an extension of ZF has the existence property iff it proves V= OD. Freyd [6] proved the category-theoretic equivalent of the existence property for various free categories.
Going back to intuitionistic theories, let us conveniently consider the language with E only, where x = y is defined as Vz(z E x ~1 z E y). Consider the following axioms of set theory: (1) Extensionality, (2) Pairing, (3) Separation, (4) Infinity, (5) Union, (6) Power Set, and (7) E-induction (because Regularity implies Excluded Middle [ 161).
Let ZFZ, be the result of adding (the scheme of) Replacement:
and let ZFZ, be the result of adding (the scheme of) Collection to (l)- (7):
or, equivalently as a scheme (by Separation):
VxEa.3yA(x,y)~3u.vx~a.3y~u.A(.~,y).
Clearly, Collection proves Replacement. In classical logic, the converse holds as well.
It is a joint result of the first author and Myhill [16] that ZFI, has the existence property (by an extension of the Kleene slash [7] ). Only a very restricted version, namely the numerical existence property is known for ZFI, (i.e., if a sentence 3x E w. A(x) is provable, then there is a numeral fi so that A(n) is provable). It was shown by a kind of recursive realizability by Beeson [ 11. On the other hand, Gijdel's negative interpretation goes through for Collection, showing that ZFI, is equiconsistent with classical ZF set theory [S] . Furthermore, ZFI, and ZF have the same provably recursive functions [9] . By the work of D. Scott, Fourman, and Grayson, ZFZ, suffices to interpret (any bounded fragment of) ZFZ, in any Heyting-valued model, indeed in any Grothendieck topos [4, 12, 5] . The same holds again for various versions of recursive realizability [7, 11. None of the counterparts of these results are known for ZFI,. In particular, it is not known whether ZFI, is equiconsistent with ZFI, + "Every f E ww is recursive,"
Recently, Goodman suggested that Kripke models might show that ZFZ, augmented with a unary predicate symbol does not prove ZFZ, augmented with the same unary predicate symbol. We use Kripke models here in a simpler way to show that ZFI, does not have the existence property. Therefore, ZFZ, does not prove ZFI,. This basic construction, due to the first author, is given in Section 1. Section 2 contains joint work on a considerable strengthening of the basic result, showing that even ZFI, with Dependent Choice and all classically true C, sentences of ZF still does not prove Collection. This is accomplished by introducing the concept of relative existence property (due to the second author). It is the unique definability from parameters satisfying finitely many formulae of a certain class. This fails for Collection, but holds (in a weak form) for Replacement.
In Section 3 (due to the first author), it is proved that ZFZ, and ZFI, do not have the same provably recursive functions.
We refer the reader now to [ 13, 2, 171 for a body of knowledge in set theory, model theory, and recursion theory used especially in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 2 we shall also refer to the methods developed in [lo].
COLLECTION LACKS THE EXISTENCE PROPERTY
Our argument takes place in ZFC + Con(ZFC). Let JV be a countable model of ZFC + V = L. Let A be the least ordinal in J1/' that is greater than all definable ordinals in ,Y' (cf. remark at the end of this section). Collapse A by forcing, to make i countable. Let A be the resulting forcing extension. In ,K, wi is greater than i. Thus we can work in ZFC + Con(1 ordinal definable in V, greater than all ordinals definable in L). Now let A!* be the structure defined as follows. Elements of A'* are all pairs (~,y), where x,.~EA&. Let R((x,y), (u, v)) iff A~(x,y)~ U. (A%!*, R) satisfies all axioms of ZF except Extensionality and Power Set. Let = be the equivalence relation on A'* given by (Vc)(R(c, a)+-+ R(c, b)).
Let F: A'* -+ .4'" be a definable function such that Thus the range of F is as large as possible, subject to the constraint of (1). Such an F is unique up to isomorphism and is defined by transtinite recursion on the rank of elements of AZ'*.
We now form the following Kripke structure. There are two moments 1 < 2. The objects at both moments are the elements of A* If A(x, ,..., x,) is a formula of ZFI with exactly X, ,..., x,, free, we let Proof: This semantics is a special case of Kripke models [20] , but it can easily be verified directly that Heyting's predicate calculus is forced at 1.
Extensionality.
Vz(z E x HZ E y ) -+ (A(x)ctA(y)).
Let 1 [~VZ(ZEX~ z E y), i.e., for all z, R(z, x) iff R(z, y), and F(z) E F(x) iff F(z)E F(y). Because F is onto, F(x) = F( y). Because F is one-to-one on equivalence classes, x = y. Then the conclusion is forced.
Pairing.
3x( y~x A ZEX). Obvious. Separation. Zlx.Vy(y~xcry~z A A(y)). Consider U= (uEF(~)IA(u)} in N, and let x' E A!* be such that for each y E A?*, R( y, x') iff R(y, z) and 1 /k A( y). Because R( y, x') implies F(y) E 1.4, let XE [x'] be such that F(x) = u.
Infinity.
3x. 3y E x. Vz E x. 30 E x. z E u. Consider w in JV and successively choose 0, I,..., n" ,..., in A'* so that F(E) =n, each new. Let x'EA%!* be such that R( y, x') iff y = 6, some n E w. Let x E [x'] be such that F(x) = CO.
Union. 3x.Vy.Vu(y~u A UEU+~EX). Let X/E&* be such that R( y, x') if R( y, u) and R(u, u), some u E ,I*.
Then R( y, x') implies F(y) E F(U), so let x E [x'] be such that F(x) = U F(u).
Power Set. 3x.Vy(Vz E y.z E u 4 y E x). This is rather delicate because Power Set does not hold in A'*. We need, however, only x E A* so that for all ye A%'*, F(y) G F(u) implies F(y) E F(x), and that F(y) c F(u) and Vz(R(z, y) -+ R(z, u)) imply R( y, x). Recall that F maps [y] l-l onto (w E JV) Vz(R(z, y) + F(z) E w)}. Suppose F(y) E F(u) and Vz(R(z, y) ---* R(z, u)); so we need consider only w in the power set of F(U) in JV. Let x' E A* be a set of all such y, i.e., R( y, x') iff F(y) z F(u) and Vz(R(z, y) + R(z, u)). Now choose XE [x'] so that F(x) is the power set of F(u) in X. for some y E A* with R( y, v). Therefore rk( y) < rk(v), so it is bounded by a definable ordinal < Iz of JP" (Lemma 1.3) , that has been made countable in J*. On the other hand, y is an uncountable ordinal. 1
Remark.
All we need is 1> rk(v), where v is definable by the formula C(u).
We thus have THEOREM 1.1. Assume Con(.ZFC). Then ZFI, does not have the existence property. In particular, it does not have the existence property for some sentence of the form COROLLARY 1.1. There is an instance of Collection that is not provable in ZFZ, .
Proof:
ZFZ, has the existence property [16] . 1
ADDING DEPENDENT CHOICE AND ALL TRUE Z,-SENTENCES
We consider the schema of Relativized Dependent Choice (RDC): Let C, be the collection of all classically true ,X', sentences in the language of ZF. In this section we prove THEOREM 2.1. Let Con(ZFC + z:,). Then there is an instance of Collection of the form 3v(3y.A( y) -+ 3y~ v.A( y)) that is not provable in ZFI, + RDC+C,.
We first modify the Kripke structure given in Section 1 to show that ZFZc + RDC + 2, lacks even a weak form of the existence property that asserts definability in parameters satisfying finitely many conditions of a certain kind. Then we prove this weak form of the existence property for ZFI, + RDC + C, .
The proofs of both facts are facilitated by Remark. Decidability condition may be dropped.
Proof Every true o,-sentence is intuitionistically equivalent to a true ,X,-sentence, because w is A,-deiinable, and '&x is well founded" can be reformulated as "there is a function f into ordinals such that (n, m) E x implies f(n) <f(m)." Function f is defined by transtinite recursion on x. For the other direction, it is crucial to observe that one does not need an intuitionistic proof that every true ,?Y',-sentence is equivalent to a true orsentence. Rather, it suffices to show that every true Cl-sentence is provable in ZFZ, + c,. We use the Godel condensation argument. Given a true z,-sentence B, use the reflection principle in ZFC for B A Extensionality, and let (y, x) be a countable well-founded extensional structure so that ( y, x ) k B. The existence of x, y is a true at-sentence that implies B in ZFZ, by the Mostowski transitive collapse. 1 LEMMA 2.2. Let A(y) be the formula stating "y is transitive, linearly ordered by E, and there is an uncountable ordinal x such that there is no l-l onto map from x to y." Then there are no true o,-sentences 3ri.3si. Bi(ri, s,), 1 < i 6 n, and a formula C(z, rl, sl,..., r,,, s,) with the free variables as exhibited, so that ZFI, + RDC + c, proves -+ 3!zC(z, r, s) A 3v (C(v, r, s)) A (3y.A*(y)+3y~v.A*(y)) (t)
ProoJ: We modify the Kripke structure given in Section 1 so that RDC is Kripke-forced at moment 1. Further analysis of the structure will show that every true rr,-sentence is Kripke-forced at moment 1. By the Levy-Shoenfield Absoluteness Lemma, we can have a countable model of ZFC + ( V= L) + (TV at moment 2. Again, let 1 be an ordinal > ot greater than any definable ordinal. Now, however, collapse I to w1 by o-closed forcing, so every new w-sequence of constructible sets is constructible. Build the nonextensional structure M* at moment 1 and the transition function F as in Section 1. Let us check RDC. Assume its antecedent is Kripke-forced at 1, in particular 1 11 A( ) z , and for each x in M*, 1 It A(x) implies 1 IF A(y) and 1 IF B(x, y) for some y in M*. Choose a sequence x0, x 1 >.-., xnt...1 so that x0 = z and 1 It A(x,), 1 Ik B(x,, x,, I ), each n. The internal o in the Kripke structure was defined in the proof of Lemma 1.1. by choosing 0, I,..., fi ,..., in M* so that F(fi) =n, all n, and F({ii},) = co. Choose ordered pairs (fi, x,)* in M* so that F((n', x,)*) = (n, F(x,)). Now we want to choose a copy J in M* of the sequence ( (6, x,)* >" so that r;(f)= {(n, Jlx,))},. W e can certainly get F(f) to include this set, because for any x in M*, F(x) satisfies Vy(R( y, x) + F(y) E F(x)) by definition of F (Section 1). To finish the proof, we must show that ( (n, F(x,) ) }n is constructible. This holds because we collapsed Iz to w1 by o-closed forcing. Now let B be a true at-sentence. By the Levy-Shoenfield Absoluteness Lemma, B is true in L, and because it is upward absolute, it is true in the forcing extension. Choose copies x0, y, in M* so that F(x,) E w x w, F( yo) E w are witnesses for B at 2. 1 [I( x is well founded), by an argument similar to the validation of Foundation in Lemma 1.1. 1 11 A(x,, yo) because A(x, y) is arithmetic. Note that 1 It-"x0, y, are decidable." Remark. The conclusion of the lemma does not stipulate provability in ZFZ, + RDC + cr, ProoJ We follow the methods of [lo] . Suppose ZFZ,+ RDC+a, proves a sentence M?(X). Let TC, be a finite fragment that proves 3xB(x). In particular, TC, involves only finitely many true o,-sentences, say k of them. Build the bounded theory TCb as in [IO] , but adding also a new kind of set constants c,, cl,..., elk together with the new axioms requiring that c2, , , c2Z witness the ith true or-sentence in TC',, together with finitely many true conditions (obtained from its subformulae) allowing each of the k true a,-sentences of TC, to be slashed. If /? is a bounded fragment of the collection of all true o,-sentences, together with the conditions on parameters just described, let CT(b) require that "Every f: w + o is recursive in b." Choose p large enough so that TCO slashes TC, in the metatheory ZFZ, + RDC + /I + CT(b). Applying 1945realizability relative to fi, we obtain a bounded fragment y 2 /3 so that ZFZ, + RDC + y proves that for some set constant T, TCb proves B(z). By a semantic interpretation of TCb, ZFZc + RDC + y proves that there is a term 5 (in finitely many parameters) so that B(t). Use q-realizability relative to y to obtain a (godelnumeral of a) term 5 (in finitely many parameters) so that ZFI, + RDC + S proves B(t), with 6 3 y. The well-foundedness conditions in y are q-realized as in [20, p. 1991 (cf. also [ 1, 111) . Finally, the conclusion of the lemma follows by compactness. 1
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let A( y ) be as in Lemma 2.2. The sentence 3u(3yA*( y) + 3y E v. A*( y)) is provable in ZFZ,. We claim that it is not provable in ZFZ, + RDC + 2,. By Lemma 2.1, it suffices to show that it is not provable in ZFI, + RDC + (T,. But its provability in ZFZ, + RDC + o1 would make Lemma 2. where A(x, y) is any formula. Both TI and MP are self-slashing, and both hold in our Kripke structure. Therefore, all the results of this section extend to TI and MP. 3 . REPLACEMENT AND COLLECTION Do NOT HAVE THE SAME PROVABLY RECURSIVE FUNCTIONS ZFZ, and ZF are equiconsistent [8] , and prove the same @ sentences [9]. Here we prove, assuming Con(ZFC), that every provably recursive function (i.e., a provable fl sentence) of ZFI, is a provably recursive function of a particular weak fragment of ZFC. We still do not know the proof-theoretic strength of ZFZ,. We conjecture that ZF proves the consistency of ZFIR. Let T be the theory in classical logic in the language of ZF, consisting of the axioms (1) Extensionality, (2) Pairing, (3) Full Separation, (4) Infinity, (5) Union, (6) Power Set, (7) Full Foundation, (8) Axiom of Choice, (9) Every well-ordering is isomorphic to an ordinal, (10) There is a cumulative hierarchy on every ordinal.
Let T = T+ Con(ZFC). Because T' is obtained from T by adding a true fl sentence, provably recursive functions of T and T' are the same. Let T" be T' + "There is no fixed point of the 1 function." Note that by truncation, T" is conservative over T' for arithmetic sentences. Working in T", we give a two-moment Kripke structure for ZFZ, The key idea is that it suffices for Replacement to hold only in the model at moment 2 to be Kripke-forced at moment 1. The model at moment 2 is built from a model of T" by using indiscernibles. Similar techniques have been utilized in [ 18, 191 using large cardinals, but with stronger conclusions. The construction here is the first author's version of the construction of Kunen that uses only Con(ZFC) to show the existence of q-like models of ZFC, for any singular cardinal cp. for any formula 4 of the given bounded complexity, and any finite sequence vi ,,..., v,, such that Iv.,,1 = 1 ui,I and the elements of the finite sequences u,, and vjz lie in the same block, say jj, in which they are strictly increasing.
(b) For any element a of any block, L, is an elementary substructure of N w.r.t. formulae of the given bounded complexity. Now take the model generated by these o blocks of w-sequences. Then their sup is cofinal and the properties (a), (b) are preserved, because they are 1st order properties. Stretch the block 1 to N, block 2 to aEtO, block 3 to h,o' etc. The model K thus obtained satisfies the desired properties.
We construct N as follows. Let S= {a 1 L,< L w.r.t. formulae of the
